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Abstract. Arapinis et al. [1] have recently proposed modications to
the operation of 3G mobile phone security in order to address newly
identied threats to user privacy. In this paper we critically examine
these modications. This analysis reveals that the proposed modica-
tions are impractical in a variety of ways; not only are there security
and implementation issues, but the necessary changes to the operation
of the system are very signicant and much greater than is envisaged.
In fact, some of the privacy issues appear almost impossible to address
without a complete redesign of the security system. The shortcomings
of the proposed `xes' exist despite the fact that the modications have
been veried using a logic-based modeling tool, suggesting that such tools
need to be used with great care.
1 Introduction
The 3GPP/ETSI 3G standards, which incorporate a range of security features
[2, 3], are the basis for a large part of the world's mobile telephony. As a result,
any security or privacy aws identied in these standards potentially have major
implications.
We are primarily concerned with one particular feature of 3G security, namely
the service known as user identity condentiality. This service seeks to minimise
the exposure of the mobile phone's long term identity (actually the long term
identity of the USIM within the phone) on the air interface, i.e. the radio path
between the phone and the network. The main security feature incorporated into
the 3G system designed to provide this service is the use of frequently changing
temporary identities, which act as pseudonyms.
A recently published paper by Arapinis et al. [1] describes two novel attacks
on this service, which enable user device anonymity to be compromised. As well
as describing the two attacks, modications (`xes') to the protocol are described
which aim to prevent the attacks, and verications of these xes using ProVerif
are also outlined.
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This paper has the following main objectives. Firstly, the proposed xes are
re-examined, and are found to have signicant shortcomings. Secondly, possi-
ble alternative approaches to some of the modications are noted. Thirdly, it is
argued that some of the weaknesses in user identity condentiality are impossi-
ble to x, meaning that making signicant system changes to address some of
them are unlikely to be worth the eort. Finally, conclusions are drawn about
the eectiveness of tools such as ProVerif if not used with appropriate care,
and in particular if used without a detailed understanding of the cryptographic
primitives being used.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2 the key
features of the 3G security architecture are briey reviewed. The attacks of
Arapinis et al. are then summarised in section 3, together with a description of
their proposed xes. Sections 4 and 5 provide an analysis of the `xes'. Finally,
the ndings of the paper are summarised and conclusions are drawn in section 6.
2 Relevant 3G Security Features
The purpose of this section is to introduce those 3G security features of relevance
to this paper. Our description follows Niemi and Nyberg [3], and we use their
notation.
2.1 The AKA Protocol
At the core of 3G air interface security is a mutual authentication and authen-
ticated key establishment protocol known as AKA (Authentication and Key
Agreement). This is regularly performed between the visited network and the
mobile phone (the user equipment (UE)). It involves the network sending an
user authentication request to the UE. The UE checks the validity of this request
(thereby authenticating the network), and then sends a user authentication re-
sponse. The network checks this response to authenticate the UE. As a result, if
successful, the two parties have authenticated each other, and at the same time
they establish two shared secret keys.
In order to participate in the protocol, the UE | in fact the User Subscriber
Identity Module (USIM) installed inside the UE | must possess two values:
{ a long term secret key K, known only to the USIM and to the USIM's `home
network', and
{ a sequence number SQN maintained by both the USIM and the home net-
work.
The key K never leaves the USIM, and the values of K and SQN are protected
by the USIM's physical security features.
The 48-bit sequence number SQN is used to enable the UE to verify the
`freshness' of the user authentication request. More specically, the request mes-
sage contains two values: RAND and AUTN, where RAND is a 128-bit random
number generated by the home network, and the 128-bit AUTN consists of the
concatenation of three values: SQNAK (48 bits), AMF (16 bits), and MAC
(64 bits). The value AMF is not relevant to our discussions here, and we do
not discuss it further. The MAC is a Message Authentication Code (or tag)
computed as a function of RAND, SQN, AMF, and the long term secret key K,
using a MAC algorithm known as f 1. The value AK, computed as a function of
K and RAND, essentially functions as a means of encrypting SQN ; this is nec-
essary since, if sent in cleartext, the SQN value would potentially compromise
user identity condentiality, given that the value of SQN is USIM-specic.
On receipt of these two values, the USIM uses the received RAND, along
with its stored value of K, to regenerate the value of AK, which it can then use
to recover SQN . It next uses its stored key K, together with the received values
of RAND and SQN, in function f1 to regenerate the MAC value; if the newly
computed value agrees with the value received in AUTN then the rst stage of
authentication has succeeded. The USIM next checks that SQN is a `new' value;
if so it updates its stored SQN value and the network has been authenticated.
If authentication succeeds, then the USIM computes another message au-
thentication code, called RES, from K and RAND using another function f 2,
and sends it to the network as part of the user authentication response. If this
RES agrees with the value expected by the network then the UE is deemed
authenticated.
We note that if the authentication process fails for some reason, then the
UE sends an error code (a Failure Case Code) as part of an Authentication
failure report, sent instead of a user authentication response ([2], section 6.3.6).
In particular, distinct error codes are sent to indicate an incorrect MAC and
an incorrect SQN, i.e. depending whether the authentication process fails at the
rst or second stage.
Finally observe that the security properties of the AKA protocol itself have
been proven to hold [4] | the problems we consider here arise from exchanges
not actually part of the AKA protocol. This makes clear the necessity to consider
the entirety of a system if robust results about security and privacy are to be
achieved.
2.2 Session Keys
As part of a successful AKA procedure, the network and the USIM generate a
pair of session keys, known as IK, the integrity key, and CK, the ciphering key.
Both these keys are a function of K and RAND. The USIM exports these two
keys to the UE. The IK is used for integrity protection of signalling messages
sent across the radio path, and the CK is used for encryption of data sent across
the air interface, using a stream ciphering technique.
2.3 User Identity Condentiality
As mentioned previously, user identity condentiality is provided by the use of
temporary identities. Every USIM has a unique International Mobile Subscriber
Identity (IMSI). If this was routinely sent across the network then the UE,
and hence its owner, could be traced. As a result, every UE also possesses a
Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identier (TMSI) which is sent instead.
The value of the TMSI, which is chosen by the network the UE is visiting, is
changed regularly. A new TMSI is sent by the network to the UE in encrypted
form, protected using the CK.
3 Privacy Threats and Fixes
3.1 The Attacks
Arapinis et al. [1] describe two apparently novel attacks that breach user identity
condentiality in 3G mobile telephony. These two threats operate as follows (for
further details see [1]).
{ IMSI paging attack. This attack exploits a specic type of signalling message
known as a Paging message (or, more formally, a PAGING TYPE 1 message
| see 8.1.2 of ETSI TS 125 331 [5]). Such messages are sent from the network
to all mobile devices in a particular area, and can contain either an IMSI or
a TMSI. If a UE detects such a message containing its IMSI or its current
TMSI then it responds with a message containing its current TMSI. Most
importantly, paging messages are not integrity protected (see 6.5.1 of ETSI
TS 133 102 [2]), and hence a malicious third party can introduce spurious
paging messages into the network. This can be used to both detect the
presence of a UE with a specic IMSI, and also to learn the current TMSI
for this device. This poses a threat to mobile identity privacy.
{ AKA error message attack. This attack exploits the error messages incorpo-
rated into the AKA protocol, as described in section 2.1 above. Suppose an
attacker has intercepted a genuine (RAND, AUTN ) pair sent to a particular
UE. If these values are relayed to a specic UE, two possible outcomes will
arise. If the recipient UE is the device to which the (RAND, AUTN ) pair
was originally sent then it will respond with an Authentication failure report
containing an error code indicating a failed SQN, i.e. to indicate that the
pair has been received previously. Otherwise, the UE will respond with a
failure report containing an error code indicating an incorrect MAC value.
That is, the error code can be used to distinguish between UEs, and this is
clearly another means of breaching user identity condentiality.
3.2 Observations
We start by observing that the rst threat, whilst apparently novel, is closely
related to another threat to user identity privacy. As described in section 6.2
of ETSI TS 133 102 [2], `when the user registers for the rst time in a serving
network, or when the serving network cannot retrieve the IMSI from the TMSI by
which the user identies itself on the radio path', the serving network must obtain
the IMSI from the UE | this is performed using a User identity request/User
identity response message pair, where the latter message contains the IMSI. `This
represents a breach in the provision of user identity condentiality'. This attack,
called user identity catching (or IMSI catching), is further mentioned in A.1 of
ETSI TS 121 133 [6], and is also noted by Arapinis et al. ([1], section 2.2).
Given that this attack exists, i.e. an active attacker can obtain the IMSI of
any UE by impersonating the network, neither of the new attacks appear to
signicantly weaken the user privacy service any further. That is, neither of the
new attacks appear to be any easier to launch than the IMSI catching attack |
in particular, they both require active impersonation of the network.
Most interestingly, the second attack seems to be an issue that has not previ-
ously been discussed in the literature. It is just one example of a very broad class
of threats arising from poorly designed error messages that reveal information
of value to an attacker | see, for example, Vaudenay [7].
3.3 The Fixes
As well as describing the two privacy issues, Arapinis et al. [1] give three separate
modications to the operation of 3G mobile telephony designed to x the two
newly identied problems as well as the well known user identity catching attack.
We next briey describe these proposed modications.
{ Fixing the IMSI paging attack. This modication is not described in complete
detail ([1], section 5.2), and as a result some suppositions need to be made.
It involves cryptographically protecting the paging message using a secret
key UK known only to the network and the UE. Like the CK and IK, this
additional key is generated as a function of the RAND and K during the
AKA protocol.
The paging message format is modied to incorporate two additional elds,
namely a sequence number SQN and a random challenge CHALL. It is not
clear whether SQN is in the same `series' as the SQN sent in the AUTN of
whether this is a distinct sequence number used for this purpose only. This
issue is discussed further in section 4 below.
The entire paging message is then encrypted using UK . However, the method
of encryption is not specied. This issue is also discussed further in section 4
below.
Since this message is broadcast, it is received by all UEs currently attached
to a base station. Each UE must use its current UK to decrypt the message.
By some (unspecied) means the recipient UE decides whether the decrypted
message is intended for it or not | Arapinis et al. simply state ([1], section
5.2) that each UE `has to decrypt and check all the received IMSI paging
to determine if it is the recipient' (sic). If it is the intended recipient, then
the UE checks the SQN against its stored value to verify its freshness (as
in AKA). If it is fresh then the USIM updates its stored SQN, and sends
a paging response containing the TMSI and the received value of CHALL;
otherwise, if the freshness check fails, the paging message is ignored.
{ Fixing the AKA error message attack. This x involves leaving the `normal'
operation of AKA unchanged; the only modication is to require (asymmet-
ric) encryption of authentication failure report messages, thereby hiding the
nature of the embedded error message. This encryption is performed using a
public encryption key belonging to the visited network. Providing a reliable
copy of this key to the UE requires the pre-establishment of a Public Key
Infrastructure (PKI) involving all the 3G network operators, in which each
network operator has an asymmetric encryption key pair and a signature
key pair. Each operator must use its private signature key to create a cer-
ticate for every other network's public encryption key. Every USIM must
be equipped with the public signature verication key of the issuing (home)
network.
In order for the UE to obtain a trusted copy of the appropriate public encryp-
tion key, the visited network must send a copy of a certicate for its public
encryption key, signed using the private signature key of the USIM's home
network (this could be achieved by modifying an existing signalling mes-
sage or by introducing a new such message). The USIM exports its trusted
copy of the public verication key of its home network to the phone, and
the phone can use this to verify the certicate, thereby obtaining the re-
quired trusted public encryption key. The phone can perform the encryption
of the failure report message, obviating the need for the USIM to perform
any computationally complex asymmetric encryption operations.
A further modication to the failure report message is proposed by Arapinis
et al. [1], namely to include the USIM's current value of SQN . This change
is designed to enable resynchronisation of this value by the network, but is
not explained further.
{ Fixing user identity catching. Finally, Arapinis et al. [1] also propose mod-
ifying the procedure by which a UE identies itself when rst joining a
network. They propose that the UE asymmetrically encrypts the User iden-
tity response message containing the IMSI. As in the previous modication,
this encryption is performed using the public encryption key of the visited
network.
4 IMSI Paging Re-Examined
There are a number of signicant issues with the x proposed to mitigate IMSI
paging attacks. We enumerate some of the most serious.
1. Introducing a new type of session key, i.e. the UK, has major ramications.
To see why we rst need to consider some issues surrounding the use of
AKA. The long term K is not passed to a visited network. Instead, the
home network of the USIM will generate, on request, sets of authentication
vectors, i.e. 5-tuples (RAND, XRES, CK, IK, AUTN ), which are passed
to the visited network. Each 5-tuple contains a random RAND value and a
distinct SQN value embedded in the AUTN . Note that several such 5-tuples
will be passed to the visited network at the same time (to reduce the number
of inter-network signalling messages), and the visited network must use them
in the correct order, i.e. in ascending order of SQN values.
When it wishes to authenticate a UE, the visited network sends the (RAND,
AUTN ) pair from the `next' authentication vector, and receives back RES,
which it compares with the XRES value from the authentication vector (the
`expected value of RES ) to authenticate the UE. Introducing an additional
key type means that the authentication vectors will need to become 6-tuples
to include the UK value, which will involve changing the formats of messages
sent between networks (this is, in itself, a signicant change).
2. As noted in section 3.3 above, there are two possible ways in which the
SQN might be generated and managed. It could be generated and veried
using the same mechanism as employed for the AKA protocol, or a separate
sequence number scheme could be involved. Unfortunately, there are major
implementation diculties with both options.
(a) Using the same SQN values as are used in the AKA protocol is prob-
lematic. The visited network does not have a means of nding out these
values, as they are not included in the authentication vectors sent to the
visited network. Even if the current SQN value was sent as part of the
authentication vector (which would aect the inter-network signalling in-
frastructure), two major problems remain. Firstly, if the visited network
is permitted to generate new SQN values and have them accepted by
the USIM, then this means that the visited network is able to modify the
SQN value stored by the USIM. This could have the eect of invalidat-
ing any unused authentication vectors that the visited network retains
for the UE. Secondly, giving the visited network the power to change
the SQN value held by the USIM is a major change in the current trust
model, and would give the visited network the power to deliberately or
accidentally completely block the operation of the USIM by sending it a
very large SQN value.
(b) Using a dierent SQN value also raises major issues, as there is no obvi-
ous mechanism to keep multiple networks aware of the current value of
the SQN for a particular UE. This would require the home network to
maintain the current value, and for visited networks to exchange mes-
sages with the home network to maintain synchronisation between the
value held by the USIM and the home network.
3. The `encryption' of the paging message appears to be intended to provide
two distinct security services: (a) guarantees to the recipient regarding the
origin and integrity of the message, and (b) condentiality of the contents
so that passive interceptors cannot observe the link between an IMSI and a
TMSI. It is well known that simple encryption cannot guarantee property
(a), especially if that means use of a stream cipher (see, for example, section
9.6.5 of Menezes, van Oorschot and Vanstone [8]). However, stream cipher
encryption is the only encryption primitive available in the current 3G se-
curity architecture. Clearly what is really required is the application of an
authenticated encryption technique [9], which would provide the necessary
security guarantees. However, this is never made explicit by Arapinis et al.
[1]. Their success in proving the security of the modication using ProVerif
suggests that their input to ProVerif implicitly assumed the provision of
properties (a) and (b), whereas their description of the necessary modica-
tions to the system did not make these requirements explicit. This shows the
danger of not carefully considering and making explicit all the properties of
the cryptographic primitives being employed.
Of course, the visited network and UE share a pair of keys (CK and IK )
designed explicitly for condentiality and integrity protection of data and
signalling messages. A much simpler solution, which achieves precisely the
same objectives, would be to rst encrypt the paging message using CK and
then generate an accompanying MAC using IK . This would both achieve the
security objectives and avoid the need to introduce an additional key type.
4. Finally, we note that, even if it could somehow be repaired, the x imposes
very signicant burdens on the system. As stated by the authors (nal sen-
tence of 5.2 of [1]) the overheads of the proposed modication are non-trivial.
This is because every UE that receives a paging message is required to de-
crypt it and somehow verify whether or not it is intended for them.
In conclusion, the number and seriousness of the issues identied with the
x, especially relating to the use of the SQN sequence number, suggest that it
cannot work in practice. Moreover, nding an alternative x without completely
redesigning the 3G system appears highly problematic. As a result it would
appear that accepting that user identity condentiality is imperfect seems in-
evitable, a point we return to below.
5 Addressing the Error Message and Identity Catching
Attacks
In evaluating the x proposed to address the AKA error message attack, we
start by considering the practicality of introducing a brand new PKI. Whilst
the required PKI is relatively small scale, involving only the network operators,
introducing such a PKI would nevertheless involve signicant changes to the
operation of the system. In particular, over and above requiring changes to all
phones, all USIMs and all networks, every USIM would need to be equipped with
a public key, every network would need to exchange public keys and certicates
with every other network, certicates (potentially quite large) would need to be
routinely sent across the air interface, and the USIM would need to routinely
transfer a public key to its host phone (across a smart card interface with a
very limited data transfer capability). That is, whilst the PKI itself might be
relatively small-scale, the changes to the air interface protocol to allow its use
would require fundamental changes to the system infrastructure. It is not even
clear how a phased deployment could be undertaken, and changing the entire
system (including all mobile phones) at a single point in time is clearly infeasible.
It is interesting to note that the diculty of providing robust identity privacy
without asymmetric cryptography has long been known | see, for example,
Mitchell ([10], section 4.1). Indeed, this point is also made by Arapinis et al.
([1], section 5.5) who make similar remarks. This suggests that modications
analogous to the proposed x have been considered in the past, and rejected for
reasons of complexity and low pay o (a point we return to below).
Moreover, deploying the required PKI requires all networks to possess two
key pairs, one for encryption/decryption and one for signature generation and
verication. This is because, in general, the widely accepted principle of key sep-
aration (see, for example, 13.5.1 of Menezes, van Oorschot and Vanstone [8])
requires that dierent keys are used for dierent purposes. However, if su-
cient care is taken, sometimes the same key pair can be securely used for both
encryption and signature, although this is not without risks (see, for example,
Degabriele et al. [11]).
We further note that if the private decryption key of any network is ever
compromised, then security is compromised. The usual solution in a PKI is
to deploy a revocation system, e.g. in the form of Certicate Revocation Lists
(CRLs). However, deploying CRLs on the scale necessary would appear to be
very challenging in a 3G system. Indeed, the diculties of deploying CRLs across
large networks are well-established, [12, 13].
One alternative to the proposed solution would simply be to remove the error
code from the error message, or, to minimise protocol modications, to program
mobile phones to always return the same error message regardless of how AKA
actually fails. This is, in any case, clearly best practice for any security protocol,
i.e. if an authentication procedure fails then the only information that should be
provided is that the process has failed, and not how.
Finally we note that implementing the proposed x to mitigate IMSI catching
is problematic. Requiring a UE to encrypt the IMSI it sends to the network
requires the phone to have a reliable copy of the network's public key. This will,
in turn, require the network to send the UE a certicate | but which one? The
UE will only be able to verify a certicate signed by the USIM's home network,
but the visited network will not know what this is until it has seen the IMSI.
That is, the UE will not be able to encrypt the IMSI for transmission to the
network until the network knows the IMSI, and hence we have a classic `chicken
and egg' problem.
6 Summary and Conclusions
It would appear that the modications proposed to address the identied privacy
threats either do not work or impose a very major overhead on the network,
over and above the huge cost in modifying all the network infrastructure. Very
interestingly, the failures in the xes arise despite a detailed analysis using formal
techniques.
Of course, making signicant changes to a protocol as widely deployed as
the 3G air interface protocol is unlikely to be feasible, so the discussion here is
perhaps rather moot. However, even where the xes appear to work, in two cases
signicantly simpler approaches appear to have been ignored. That is, removing
the error messages would mitigate the AKA error message attack (and would
also conform to good practice), and it would appear that the introduction of a
new key UK is unnecessary. If changes are to be made, then it is vital to try to
minimise their impact on the operations of the system.
Most signicantly in any discussion of whether it might be worth trying to
implement `xed up' versions of the xes, there exist `passive' attacks on user
identity condentiality other than those discussed thus far. For example, a ma-
licious party wishing to discover whether or not a particular phone is present
in a cell could simply inaugurate a call to the phone or send it an SMS, si-
multaneously monitoring messages sent across the network. If such a procedure
is repeated a few times, then it seems likely to be sucient to reveal with high
probability whether a particular phone is present, especially if the network is rel-
atively `quiet'. Such an attack only requires passive observation of the network,
and hence would be simpler to launch than attacks requiring a false base station
(which is the case for all the attacks we have discussed previously). Moreover,
addressing such an attack would be almost impossible.
We can thus conclude that not only are the proposed xes highly problem-
atic, but providing a robust form of user identity condentiality is essentially
impossible in practice. That is, if robust identity condentiality is not achiev-
able, then it is very unlikely to be worth the huge cost of making changes of the
type proposed. The `pay o' in mitigating some threats but not others is small
relative to the overall cost of implementing them.
Finally, the practical and security issues encountered in considering the de-
tailed implementation of the proposed modications suggests that the use of
formal tools to try to guarantee security and privacy properties should be used
with great care. In particular, any such analysis should always be accompanied
by an analysis of the practical working environment for the security protocol.
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